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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM D. MILLETT,
Plaintiff-Appel Iant,
vs.

Case No. 16385

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH - BOARD OF REVIEW,
Defendant-Respondent.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as amended, for the purpose of judicial review of a decision of
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirming the decision of the Appeal Referee, which denied benefits to
the Plaintiff for a period of sixty-two (62) weeks and assessed
an overpayment in the amount of $1,785.00, on the grounds the
Plaintiff knowingly withheld material facts regarding work and
earnings in order to receive benefits to which he was not
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entitled.

The questions are whether the Findings of Fact are

supported by the evidence and whether the law was properly
applied in the instant case.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of
Review that Plaintiff was not eligible for unemployment compensation during the period in question and that the overpayment
in the amount of $1,785.00 be set aside.

Defendant seeks affirm-

ance of the decision of the Board of Review.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant agrees with the dates and sequence of events set
forth in Plaintiff's statement of Facts.

However, inasmuch as

Plaintiff's Statement of Facts also contains considerable comment as to Plaintiff's state of mind and his interpretation of
the law, Defendant offers the following summary of the facts:
Plaintiff filed his initial claim for unemployment compensation
effective January 22, 1978.

(R.0001, 0010)

He thereafter filed

weekly claims for benefits through February 25, 1978.

Plaintiff

reopened his claim effective July 2, 1978 and continued to file
claims through September 30, 1978.

Plaintiff received a total

of $2,053.00 in unemployment compensation.

(R.0010)

Plaintiff began working for Rhead Realty Construction on
February 12, 1979.

He earned $121.00 during the week ended

February 18, 1979 and $220.00 during the week ended February 25,
1979.

(R.0004)

Plaintiff filed claims for each of the weeks
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ended February 18 and February 25, 1978,certifying thereon that
he had no work or earnings by placing the word "none" in the
space provided on each claim for reporting earnings.
0003)

(R. 0002,

Plaintiff received payment from Rhead Realty Construction

for his work during the week ended February 18, 1978 on or
before February 24, 1978, as evidenced by the paycheck which was
paid by the issuing bank on February 24, 1978.

(R. 0004, 0005);

Plaintiff also admits in his brief at page 3 that he received a
check on February 24, 1978.

He was paid for the week ended

February 25, 1978 on or before March 10, 1978, the date on which
the issuing bank paid that check.

(R. 0004, 0006)

On November 14, 1978, a telephone hearing was conducted by
Department Representative at Plaintiff's request.

The Depart-

ment Representative found that Plaintiff had violated Section
35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act and disqualified
the Plaintiff for a period of 52 weeks from February 12, 1978
to February 10, 1979,and established an overpayment in the
amount of $1,785.00, representing the benefits received by
Plaintiff during the disqualification period.

(R. 0008)

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Hearing Representative on November 30, 1978.

(R.0009)

After an in-person hear-

ing before an Appeals Referee, the decision of the Hearing
Representative was affirmed.

CR. 0022, 0023)

Upon further

appeal, the Board of Review of the- Industrial Conunission of
Utah affirmed the decisions of the Appeal Referee and the Hearing Representative in case number 78-A-3045, 79-BR-04.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
THE COURT WILL AFFIRM THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF
SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE,
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is
well established.

Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated

1953,

provides in part:
In any judicial proceedings under this section
the findings of the Commission and the Board of
Review as to the facts if supported by evidence
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said
Court shall be confined to questions of law.
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of
the
they

Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence,
will not be disturbed.

131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).

Ma:r>tinez v. Board of Review,

25 U. 2d

A reversal of an order of the Depart-

ment denying compensation can only be justified if there is no
substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the facts
giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the
Department's denial was clearly capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable.
Security,

Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Depa:r>tment of Employment

13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962);

2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45

(1966).

Gocke v. Wiesley,

This Court stated in

18 U.

Members of

Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104, Utah 242, 248;

139 P. 2d 208, 211,

(1943), that:

If there is substantial competent evidence to
sustain the findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this Court may not set aside
the decision even though on a review of the
record we might well have reached a different
result.
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This Court has adhered to the same standard of review in
cases involving violation of Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah
Employment Security Act.

Deaker v. Industrial Corrmission of Utah,

Department of Employment Semirity, 533 P. 2d 898

(1975);

Whitaome v.

Department of Employment Security, Industrial Corrmiss1'.on of Utah, 564 P. 2d
1116 (1977).

POINT II
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW HAVE
PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE INTENT OF THE UTAH STATE
LEGISLATURE WITH RESPECT TO SECTIONS 35-4-5(e), 6(d)
AND 6(e), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED,
Sections 35-4-5(e), 6(d), and 6(e), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, provide:
35-4-5 - An individual shall be ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing
a waiting period:
(e) For the week with respect to which
he had willfully made a false statement
or representation or knowingly failed to
report a material fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions of this act, and
for the 51-week period immediately following and until he has repaid to the fund all
monies he received by reason of his fraud
and which he received during such following 51-week disqualification period,
provided that determinations under this
subsection shall be made only upon a sworn
written admission, or after due notice and
recorded hearing; provided that when a
claimant waives the recorded hearing a
determination shall be made based upon all
of the facts which the commission, exercis·ing due diligence, has been able to obtain;
and provided further that such determination
shall be appealable in the manner provided
by this act for appeals from other benefit
determinations.
35-4-o(d) - Any person who, by reason of his fraud,
has received any sum as benefits under this
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act to which he was not entitled shall be
liable to repay such sum to the commission
for the fund.
If any person, by reason of his
own fault, has received any sum as benefits
under this act to which under a redetermination or decision pursuant to this section, he has been found not entitled, he shall
be liable to repay such sum, and/or shall, in
the discretion of the commission, be liable to
have such sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him.
In any case in which
under this subsection a claimant is liable
to repay to the commission any sum for the
fund, such sum shall be collectible in the
same manner as provided for contributions
due under this act.
(e) If any person has received any sum as
benefits under this act to which under a
redetermination or decision he was not entitled,
and it has been found that he was without fault
in the matter, he is not liable to repay such
sum but shall be liable to have such sum deducted
from any future benefits payable to him with
respect to the benefit year current at the time
of such receipt.
Plaintiff contends that the Department, the Board of Review
and the Utah Supreme Court have improperly interpreted the intent
of the Utah State Legislature in its enactment of Section 35-4-5(e),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
Points I, III and IV.)

(See Plaintiff's Brief,

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that

prior to 1959, the Section 5(e) disqualification period related
to the other disqualification periods contained in the Utah
E~ployment

Security Act, such as for voluntary leaving, discharge,

or failure to accept suitable work.

The Employment Security Act

was, in fact, amended in 1949 to change the penalty for fraud
from a variable two to ten week disqualification to a uniform
fifty-two week disqualification.

The Act was also amended to

increase the penalty period for discharge for dishonesty constituting a crime from a variable two to ten week disqualification
to a uniform fifty-two week disqualification.
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The legislative history of the 1949 amendments to the
Employment Security Act (designated as House Bill 166) is
inadequate to determine whether the legislature intended the
penalty period for Section 35-4-5(e) to be co-extensive with
the penalty periods provided elsewhere in the Act.
House and Senate Journals for 1949.)

(See

While it is true that

a violation of Section 5{e) must be based on a misrepresentation or omission made material by the other provisions of the
Act, there is nothing contained in the Employment Security
Act which can be construed to require or even suggest that the
disqualification for fraud should be limited to a period of
time equal to the disqualification period of the section of
law from which materiality is derived.

On the contrary, all

of the disqualification periods set forth in Section 5 of the
Employment Security Act remained variable with the exceptions of
the penalties for fraud and discharge for dishonesty constituting
a crime.

It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the legis-

lature intended to establish only a set and harsh penalty for
each of these infractions, without reference to any other disqualification period.
Stated simply, the present interpretation of Sections
35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) is that an individual who commits a
fraud upon the Unemployment Compensation Fund invokes the full
administrative penalty of fifty-two weeks disqualification.

He

is further denied the right to receive any unemployment benefits
until he has repaid all money received during the fifty-two weeks
disqualification.
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Although administrative or legislative construction of
statutes may provide some aid in interpretation, it is ultimately the responsibility of the judicial branch of the government to construe laws enacted by the legislature.
2nd,

Statutes, Section 142.)

penalty for fraud can be harsh.

(See 7 3 Am. Jur.

There is no question that the
This point was well stated in

the case of Decker v. Industrial Commission

(Utah, 1975) 533 P. 2d

898, 899, in which this Court held:
Plaintiff also complains that the deprivation of fifty-two weeks of benefits is a
severe penalty.
With this we are inclined
to agree.
However, under the statute it
does not appear that the fact finder or
this court has the discretion to reduce or
forgive any part of the penalty.
The Court then went on to comment that the overpayment is governed by Section 35-4-6(d).
This position was confirmed by the holding of the Court in
Whiteome v. Department of Emrloyment Seeurity
111~

(Utah 1977) 564 P. 2d

1117, wherein the Court stated:
It should be noted that one known false statement or known failure to report a material fact
to obtain a benefit is sufficient to invoke this
section of the Act and that the fifty-two week
disqualification then takes effect and weekly
benefits thereafter received within the disqualification period although pursuant to submission
of perfectly honest weekly claim forms are overpayments and must be repaid to the Department.
In this reqard it is interesting to note that the Employment

Security Act makes no distinction between "simple" fraud and
"compound" fraud, as Plaintiff attempts to do at page 14 of his
Brief.
In the recent case of Diprizio v. Industrial Commission,
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(Utah,

1977), 572 P. 2d 679, 681, Mr. Chief Justice Ellett, speaking
for the majority, wrote:
If a discretion is to be given to the Commission to ignore or modify an unambiguous statute,
then that should be done by the legislature and
not by this Court.
Although Mr. Justice Crockett dissented in Dipr1:zio on the grounds
that some exercise of discretion is necessary to achieve individualized justice,

(572 P. 2d, at page 682) he has subsequently

acknowledged that the decisions in Deaker and Diprizio now cons titute the law in this area.

Mr. Justice Crockett's position is

consistent with the generally acknowledged principle that once a
statutory construction has been made and followed it should not
be altered.

(73 Am.JuL 2d, Statutes, Section 143.)

It should also be noted in this regard that in construing
a statute it is proper to consider the particular evils at which
the legislation is aimed.

(73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, Section 157.)

In responding to this specific issue once before, this Court stated:
Neither are we persuaded by the Plaintiff's
further argument that because the order made
is so severe and arbitrary that it runs contrary to and defeats the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act that it should be
unconditionally reversed and no further consideration be given it.
It is true of course
that the general purpose of that act is to
alleviate the burdens that result on individuals and upon the economy generally because
of the hardships of unemployment.
But it is
equally true that the act and the funding which
supports it must be protected against unjustified claims of persons who would prefer unemployment benefits to employment, and who engage
in various artifices including falsification
and fraud to obtain benefits.
In order to
carry out the salutary purposes of the act, it
is necessary not only that there is a means of
obtaining reimbursement but also of penalizing
those who would so of fend.
(Diprizio v. Industrial
Commission, Supra, at p. 680.)
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Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 5(e) would render
a nullity of any penalty except in those cases where the fraud
is discovered at its inception, for certainly the individual
who is required after the fact to repay only those monies
obtained by reason of his fraud suffers no penalty whatsoever.
Such would be the situation in the instant case were Plaintiff's
interpretation of Sections 35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) to be adopted
by this Court.
Plaintiff cites two prior Board of Review cases in support
of the proposition that the Industrial Commission does give some
interpretation to Section 35-4-5(e).

Without belaboring the fact

that it is the responsibility of the Industrial Commission to
provide some small degree of interpretation to the provisions
of law the Commission must administer, it is sufficient to point
out that neither case cited by Plaintiff is material to the
instant matter.

In case No. 65-BR-395 the Hearing Representative

erroneously calculated the overpayment.

When he tried to correct

the overpayment by amending his decision, the Board of Review
ruled that the original decision had become final and the Hearing
Representative had no jurisdiction to consider the matter further.
Thus, Case No. 65-BR-395 involved an issue of jurisdiction,
rather than interpretation of Section 35-4-5(e).
Case No.

75-BR-90 involves an attempt by the Board of Review

to ameliorate the effects of the penalty contained in Section
35-4-5(e), consistent with the wording of that section and the
intent of the statute.

The Board of Review held that while a

claimant who had been found in violation of Section 35-4-5(e)
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could not receive benefits, he could file claims after the
initial fifty-two weeks disqualification, which claims, if
otherwise eligible, might be used to offset his overpayment.
The penalty is not reduced or forgiven in any part.

The

fifty-two weeks disqualification must be served and the full
overpayment must be repaid.

However, repayment may be accom-

plished by filing of valid claims after expiration of the
disqualification period.

The Industrial Commission recognizes

that the Court may, in an appropriate case, conclude that such
an approach is or is not consistent with the plain meaning of
Section 35-4-5(e).

However, adjudication of this question

must await an appropriate case in which the Commission's position
is actually at issue.

POINT III
SECTION 35-4-5(E), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED,
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff cites

Dandridge v. WiUicuns,

397 U.S. 471 (1971), in

reference to the requirement of equal protection that any legislative distinction between classes must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.

Plaintiff asserts that

Section 35-4-5(e) creates two classes of individuals:

(1)

those

who receive unemployment benefits during the penalty period and
must repay those benefits, and (2) those individuals who receive
no such benefits during the penalty period and therefore have no
repayment requirement.
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In the Dandridge case, supra, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
In the area of economics and social welfare,
a State does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made
by its laws are imperfect.
If the classification has some 'reasonable' basis,' it does not
offend the Constitution simply because the
classification ~s not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality.'
'The problems of government
are practical ones and may justify, if they do
not require, rough accommodations - illogical
it may be, and unscientific.'
'A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.'
(Citations omitted, 397 U. s., at
p. 485.)
The only two classes of individuals created by the Utah
Employment Security Act are those who are eligible to receive
unemployment benefits and those who are not eligible.

The Legis-

lature has a legitimate concern in preventing fraud on the Unemployment Compensation Fund by penalizing those who engage in such
activity.

( Diprizio v. Industr-;aZ Commission, supra. )

As in the Dandridge

case, the effects of the statute may be felt more harshly by some
than by others.

But, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Dandridge:

The Equal Protection Clause does not require
a State to choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem [viz unemployment fraud]
or not attacking the problem at all. (Dandridge
v. Williams, supra, at p. 486.)
In this regard it is important to note that under Plaintiff's
proposed interpretation of Section 35-4-5(e), there would be no
penalty for fraud except to the extent the fraud can be discovered prior to the expiration of the statutorily set fifty-two
weeks disqualification period.

In all cases where benefits are

received for weeks subsequent to the act of fraud there would be
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no repayment requirement.

In those instances where the fraud

is not discovered until after the expiration of the fifty-two
weeks disqualification period, the claimant would be required
merely to repay the money obtained by reason of his fraud.
In addition, two classes of claimants would again be established under Section 35-4-5(e):

(1)

those whose fraud is dis-

covered in time to make them subject to disqualification for the
balance of the fifty-two weeks penalty period,

l2) and those whose

fraud is not discovered until after the fifty-two weeks penalty
period has expired.

The latter class would have the advantage of

being able to receive benefits during the disqualification period
while the former class might not.
It is apparent that Plaintiff's interpretation of Section
5(e) provides no meaningful solution to the problems of the legislature in attempting to provide a significant protection for the
Unemployment Compensation Fund.

This is clearly the type of

legislative provision that falls within the doctrine of the

Dandridge case.

POINT IV
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE
APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR JN DETERMINING THAT
PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY WITHHELD MATERIAL INFORMATION
JN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT
ENTITLED,
It has previously been held that intention to defraud is
inherent in the claims themselves when such claims contain false
statements and fail to set forth material information required
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by statute.
1295.

Martinez v. Industrial Commission,

(Utah, 1978) 576 P. 2d

The filing of such a claim is in and of itself a manisfes-

tation of intent to defraud.
Commission of Utnh,

(Utah,

Mincer v. Board of llevie1,; of the Industrial

1977) 572 P.

2d 1364.

In the instant case the Plaintiff contends that he began
working for Rhead Realty Construction on a trial basis for which
he did not expect to be paid.

(R.0017; Plaintiff's Brief, page 3.)

Plaintiff received his first paycheck on or before February 24,
1978,

(R.0004) and he cashed it on February 24, 1978 (R.0005)

Yet, on February 28, 1978, just

four days after cashing his pay-

check, the Plaintiff filed his claim for unemployment benefits,
certifyinc; "ncne" in the space provided for reporting his earnings.
(R.0003)
Furthermore, when asked why he did not report his hours of
work as required by Item 2.b. of the claim card, Plaintiff responded:
I was under the impression, because I read
that, or that little booklet they gave with
us, and I, I didn't know, of course they say
ignorance is no excuse either, but I didn't
know I was supposed to put down work down there
unless I was getting paid for it. And that's
why I put none.
Because if I would have been,
if the would have said no, we don't want ou,
out o two weeks, t en I'
have been outta
unemployment for two weeks too.
{R.0015)
{Emphasis added.)
Thus, the evidence is substantial and compelling that
Plaintiff intentionally withheld the fact of his work and
earnings to obtain unemployment benefits to which he knew he
was not entitled.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff knew that work and earnings should be reported
to the Commission.

He received and cashed a paycheck for work

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

performed during the weeks in question.
and just

Despite that knowledge

four days after cashing his first paycheck, Plaintiff

certified to the Commission that he had no work or earnings.
Plaintiff's

contentions that Section 35-4-S(e), Utah Code

Annotated 1953, as amended, has been previously interpreted in
error are

~ithout

merit.

Therefore, the decision of the

Commission should be affirmed.
day of September, 1979.

Respectfully submitted this

ROBERT B, HANSEN)
Attorney General

FLOYD G, ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

BY:
K. Allan Zabel
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Defendant's Brief to Merlin G. Calver, Attorney for
Plaintiff,2651 Washington Boulevard, Suite No. 9, Ogden, Utah,
84401, this

day of September, 1979.

K. ALLAN ZABEL
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